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The Mismeasurement 
of Illegal Drug Markets
The Implications of Its Irrelevance
Peter Reuter 
University of Maryland
The largest illegal market in the United States currently is that for 
illegal drugs. It may be, in terms of share of Gross National Product, 
the largest ever. Given the poor quality of estimates of income from 
any other illegal market, the statement is hard to challenge but I believe 
that one can make a reasonable case that, compared with the other can 
didates (e.g., prostitution, illegal gambling, counterfeiting), illegal 
drugs are likely to generate much higher total revenues to sellers. Cer 
tainly numbers are presented in a variety of fora, predominantly politi 
cal, suggesting that it is a major economic activity both in the United 
States and globally. Figures such as $500 billion for world sales are 
thrown around quite glibly. 1
Even brief scrutiny of the global numbers suggests that they are 
grossly overstated. Though drug markets are large and involve a sur 
prisingly large number of Americans on a part-time basis, the total 
value of annual sales in the United States is likely to be around $50 bil 
lion, less than 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product and less than 2 per 
cent of personal consumption expenditures.2 The global figure is likely 
to be no more than twice this. One hundred billion dollars represents a 
large market, but in the context of total global trade flows of almost $3 
trillion, it is a very modest share indeed. That share declines to the triv 
ial when account is taken of the fact that most of the value added is 
domestic, so that valuing the trade at import prices reduces it to proba 
bly no more than $20 billion.
In recent years, the federal government has developed systematic 
estimates of domestic expenditures that do indeed provide a reasonable 
basis for scaling the size of these markets. However, these coexist with 
an essentially madcap series of federal figures on international produc 
tion and prices that make a mockery of the whole enterprise. These
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estimates and their components are so inconsistent and erratic that they 
demonstrate what might reasonably be called a "reckless disregard" for 
the truth. Moreover, though it would be surprising if the government 
estimates of domestic expenditures were (say) only half of the true 
value, the year-to-year fluctuations in these estimates may be wrong 
even in direction, let alone scale.
Does this mismeasurement matter? For those interested in the size 
of the underground economy, the answer is clearly yes; estimates of the 
largest illegal market are potentially of considerable significance. 
However, the estimates were not developed for those purposes, but to 
help in the development of drug policy. If policy making with respect 
to drugs were rational, or at least as analytically driven as, say, 
monetary policy, then the exaggeration would be a serious problem. I 
shall argue that the numbers are in fact just decorations on the policy 
process, rhetorical conveniences for official statements without any 
serious consequences. Indeed, the irrelevance of the numbers is itself a 
condemnation of drug policy decision making.
This paper has three sections. The first examines the official esti 
mates of drug production, both in the United States and the rest of the 
world, and sales in the United States, showing how implausible they 
are. The second describes the process that generates the estimates and 
its bureaucratic imperatives. Finally, I consider the policy interpreta 
tion of the mismeasurement.
The Estimates
The U.S. devotes considerable resources to estimation of drug pro 
duction by other nations.3 Those estimates, published each year in the 
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (INCSR), are essen 
tially without competition internationally; certainly they are regarded 
as more authoritative than any other reports, such as the documents of 
the United Nations International Drug Control Program, which them 
selves often cite the INCSR estimates. The failure to include estimates 
of U.S. domestic production, particularly of marijuana is a conspicuous 
omission, explained awkwardly by the specific use to which Congress
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intended to put these numbers, namely, providing incentives to other 
countries to improve their drug control efforts.4
No detail has ever been published on the methodology of these esti 
mates, beyond the fact that they are generated from estimates of grow 
ing area, crop per acre, and refining yield per ton of raw product; the 
information sources, even the technology used to produce them (for 
area estimates) are classified. But while the estimation task is clearly a 
difficult one, the current estimates have unnecessarily low credibility. 
They show inexplicable inconsistency over time and across sectors of 
the industry. Some numbers are simply implausible.
Consider as an example of the unprincipled variation over time, esti 
mates of Burmese opium production, consumption, and export. Burma 
has been estimated to be the largest producer of opium for the illicit 
market since the early 1980s; since 1989 it may have accounted for 
over half of world production. In the 1991INCSR, the opium available 
for refining (primarily into heroin) for 1988 was estimated to be 679 
metric tons; the figure for 1989 was 1600 metric tons, an increase of 
more than 140 percent. 5 The difference reflected two factors: (1) A rise 
in total production, generated by a 25 percent increase in cultivation 
and an unexplained increase in yield per acre; and (2) a dramatic 
reduction in exports of opium (as opposed to heroin). The result was 
that estimated heroin production increased from 68 tons to 128 tons.
Then in the following year, the 1992 INCSR revised the figure for 
domestic consumption in 1988 downward from 400 tons to 150 tons, 
reflecting a downward revision in the number of Burmese opium users 
from 400,000 to 34,000. Yet this did not lead to any change in the esti 
mate of the amount available for refining in 1988. Also odd is that a 25 
percent increase in the estimated number of Burmese heroin users from 
12,000 in 1988 to 15,000 in 1989 led to a more than doubling of the 
estimate in Burmese domestic heroin consumption from 2.0 tons to 4.5 
tons.6
These are figures that do not bear close scrutiny, either individually 
or collectively. The number of opium users in Burma is unlikely to fall 
by 90 percent in one year; clearly some analyst in 1992 decided that 
previous assumptions about the number of opium users in Burma were 
overstated. Given that the United States has had the thinnest diplomatic 
relations with Burma since about 1989, it is highly unlikely that this 
change resulted from acquisition of any substantial new data. Simi-
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larly, the decision to increase the estimated average consumption of 
Burmese heroin addicts in 1989 was probably no more than some ana 
lyst's distant judgment. The reasonable stability of the total in recent 
years hides implausible variation in the components of the estimates. 
The totals have little credibility.
The problems are illustrated even more graphically by the published 
estimates for Mexican marijuana production in the late 1980s. 7 
Whereas Burma is distant and hostile, with a government that has little 
control in many of the major opium producing areas, Mexico is close, 
an ally for most purposes, and (except for Chiappas since 1994) firmly 
in control of its drug producing territory. Yet the Mexican estimates 
have relied on often inconsistent and inadequately described methodol 
ogies, leading some analysts, including one at the Bureau of Interna 
tional Narcotics Matters (INM), to conclude that actual production is 
"unknowable" and that the agency's estimates are at best rather unsci 
entific guesswork.8
The preface to the 1988 annual report of the National Narcotics 
Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC, an interagency group 
chaired by the Drug Enforcement Administration) warns that "there is 
little reliable data upon which to base estimates of the quantities of 
drugs involved" (NNICC 1988). Yet, notwithstanding the lack of first 
hand evidence of illicit activity that limits accurate production mea 
sures, it is often claimed that "the general trends portrayed can be con 
sidered reliable" (NNICC 1984). In the 1980s, this was belied by 
discrepancies in the trends for the two official series for these esti 
mates, provided by NNICC and the INCSR. For example, the NNICC 
estimate of net production (after eradication) rose in 1986 to 5,460 
metric tons from 4,125 the year before; the INCSR estimates for the 
same years were 2,800 in 1986 and 2,700 in 1985. Note that they differ 
substantially both in absolute value and in the trend; the NNICC fig 
ures were higher and rising while the INCSR figures were lower and 
essentially flat. In 1987 INM showed a slight decrease (about 5 per 
cent) while the NNICC showed an increase of about one-third. INM 
officials explained the discrepancy in the mid-1980s as follows: "The 
Department of State considers its country estimates more reliable 
because the data were derived principally from aerial surveys. There 
are, however, no survey data on marijuana cultivation in Mexico; the 
State Department relied on random reports from Mexico that were
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higher than the NNICC figure, which is an extrapolation of seizure 
data" (General Accounting Office 1988, p. 53). This is less an explana 
tion than an evenhanded condemnation of both estimates!
The fundamental unsoundness of the whole series of estimates was 
demonstrated vividly at the end of the decade. The U.S. estimate of 
Mexican marijuana production was dramatically increased in the 1990 
INCSR, from a total of 5,700 tons in 1988 to 47,000 tons in 1989, as 
the result of changes in estimation techniques.9 No details of those 
changes were provided in the published document. Yet it was possible 
to determine, with no great technical skill, that these figures were 
implausibly high and should never have been published.
Consider the various ways that Mexican marijuana might have been 
disposed of: seizures, domestic Mexican consumption, exports to 
Europe, and exports to the United States. Mexican domestic consump 
tion is thought to be quite low, notwithstanding the important historical 
association of marijuana in the United States with Mexican immigrant 
groups in the 1930s, a major factor in the passage of the Marijuana 
Stamp Act in 1937. The State Department estimated the total in the late 
1980s to be 100 tons. There are no reports of Mexican exports to Euro 
pean markets, probably because Mexico is not well located to compete 
with North African, Middle Eastern and domestic production in 
Europe, which is primarily a hashish rather than marijuana market any 
way. Seizures are usually estimated at a few hundred tons. Nonethe 
less, assume that all these figures are major underestimates and that the 
total for seizures, Mexican consumption, and European exports was 
12,000 tons.
This would leave 35,000 tons for consumption in the U.S. markets. 
How many marijuana users would have to purchase the Mexican prod 
uct to dispose of this? Rhodes et al. (1995, p. 20) estimated that a joint 
in 1993 had an average of 0.136 ounces (0.39 grams) of marijuana. 
However, Mexican origin marijuana is believed to be of lower potency, 
so let us assume that each joint contains 1 gram; this will bias the cal 
culation in favor of finding large figures plausible.
A very heavy user of marijuana consumes about three joints per 
day. Giving the user time off for colds and work-related drug tests, 
assume that he or she consumes this amount 333 days a year; this (con 
veniently) gives a total of 1 kilogram of marijuana annually. That 
implies that we need 35 million very heavy marijuana smokers to con-
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sume 35,000 tons; that would be about half of all persons aged 15-35, 
the heavy user ages (Chen and Kandel 1995). And this does not take 
into account consumption of domestic U.S. production or what is 
imported from Jamaica, Colombia, etc. Yet reasonable estimates of the 
total number of heavy users (at least one joint per day) are only about 
one-tenth of the 35 million needed to dispose of the imports from Mex 
ico. Moreover, other estimates of total U.S. consumption have been far 
lower; e.g., Kleiman (1989) came up with figures for 1985 of only 
about 5,000 tons and prevalence was still declining in the late 1980s.
Perhaps as the result of this critique, the 1991 INCSR announced a 
further revision in estimation methodology. The estimate of area har 
vested was increased, reflecting a dramatic downward revision in the 
estimate of acreage eradicated. However, a new distinction was intro 
duced between "usable plant yield" and "whole plant yield"; the 
former, more relevant to consumption estimates, was put at only half 
the latter. The new 1989 estimate of usable plant available for export 
after domestic consumption and Mexican seizures was 29,700 tons. 
Though an improvement over the previous figure, it was still utterly 
implausible, requiring U.S. consumers to account for far more than is 
consistent with current estimates of prevalence. Only in 1991 did the 
official figures start to approach even remotely plausible levels, though 
still being far higher than other estimates of total U.S. consumption.
Though I will not describe all the twists and turns since then, it is 
worth noting the current state of estimates. The 1994 INCSR lists the 
following series for usable plant yield:




SOURCE: 'International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (1994).
Only for the 1990 figure is any footnote explanation offered suggesting 
a change in methodology; yet no one seriously maintains that 1993 
Mexican cannabis production is 20 percent of its 1989 level. The 
wholly implausible 1989 figure remains in the series, though the 
INCSR makes numerous later year revisions.
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Another means of establishing the implausibility of the 1989 and 
1990 figures is to consider their implications for Mexican export earn 
ings. The farmgate price of marijuana in Mexico was estimated to be 
$50 to $100 per pound; the border price, after distribution within Mex 
ico, was estimated at $136 to $455 per pound. Even taking the lower 
bound of the border price (which seems very low, given other price 
estimates for wholesale prices in the United States), the 35,000 tons of 
marijuana exports generates earnings of $11 billion for 1989, com 
pared to recorded export earnings of $40 billion; surely this would be 
enough to make nonsense of analyses of Mexican currency fluctua 
tions.
These figures should never have survived a review process. As the 
above analysis suggests, it is easy to establish that they are far outside 
the plausible range. Yet the estimation process is so detached from 
analysis of domestic indicators that these figures have been able to sur 
vive for many years. Colleagues of mine at RAND have recently devel 
oped elementary "mass conservation" models that impose consistency 
checks on estimates; 10 the Mexican figures do not survive in that kind 
of framework. The discipline is simple enough that one may reason 
ably ask why it has not been done before.
International Price Series
The federal government also publishes "The Illicit Drug Wholesale/ 
Retail Price Report," which contains price data for foreign production 
covering both intermediate and final product. Though prices are in 
principle easier to observe than quantities, these series show obvious 
inconsistencies. This is not the place for a lengthy description of all the 
anomalies of these series. Instead let me just provide two illustrations:
1. In every year for which the data are published, the price for 
refined cocaine is lower in Colombia than the other two major produc 
ing countries (Bolivia and Peru). Yet it is also asserted that most 
exports of Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine go through Colombia. It is 
difficult to tell an economically plausible story in which Colombian 
exporters prefer to buy the more expensive product in foreign coun 
tries, and then incur the cost and risk of shipping it into Colombia for 
re-export. If there is some constraint on expanding production in
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Colombia, the price for that cocaine should be higher, representing its 
transportation cost advantage. 11
2. The relative prices of the intermediate product, base, and the final 
product (HCL) move erratically for both Bolivia and Peru. In 1990 the 
difference between HCL and base prices in Peru is reported to be 
$3,480; in Bolivia in the same year the difference is $1,525. In 1992 
the Peruvian margin has increased to $4,950, while the Bolivian mar 
gin has slipped to $1,150. Given the low transportation cost for base 
and the ease of processing, the large and growing difference between 
processing costs in the two countries seem quite implausible.
The heroin series are no better. The price of morphine, an intermedi 
ate product in the refining of illicit heroin, is sometimes recorded as 
higher than the final product. The export price of heroin from South 
east Asia is stable in the late 1980s, notwithstanding large increases in 
estimated product and falling prices elsewhere.
Expenditure Estimates
Only recently have domestic counterparts to the foreign production 
estimates become available from the government. Though estimates of 
the number of persons using illicit drugs are produced annually 12 and 
attract a great deal of attention, there has never been a similar interest 
in quantities and expenditures; the sources and implications of this lack 
of interest are discussed in the final section. The Office of National 
Drug Control Policy has been sponsoring such estimates since 1991 
but they have attracted little attention or scrutiny. 13 The most recent 
available figures are given in tables 2 and 3.
In contrast to the international figures, these estimates are thor 
oughly documented and have their origins in very diverse types of cal 
culations. The cocaine and marijuana estimates are derived from the 
household survey data, supplemented by various other surveys that 
cover populations (e.g., prisoners and college dormitory students) not 
included in the household survey, or which provide more data about 
the average amounts consumed by particular groups of users. Given 
that a small share of all users account for a large share of total cocaine 
consumption, particular attention is given to ethnographic studies that 
include consumption figures for heavy users. 14
The Mismeasurement of Illegal Drug Markets 71













































SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, tables 5 and 6).
NOTE: The manjuana consumption totals are estimated from figures provided in table 6 on the
number of users, number of joints per months per user, and the weight of marijuana per joint.
Table 3. Total U.S. Expenditures on Illicit Drugs, 1988-1993 










































SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, table 8).
Heroin estimates are generated by a different process, since The 
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse is thought to miss most of 
the population of frequent heroin users, who tend to be transient if not 
homeless and difficult to track down for interviews. The estimates are 
generated by a complex procedure from the number seeking admission 
to treatment and interviews with intravenous drug users in a large scale 
ethnographic study. 15
Note first that the marijuana consumption estimates in table 2 are 
almost an order of magnitude smaller than implied by the Mexican 
production estimates, though most of that production is destined for
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the U.S. market. Even the recent INCSR estimates for Mexico are at 
least eight times those for total U.S. consumption. That seven hundred 
tons in 1993 generated almost $10 billion in retail sales; assuming 
prices are measured with reasonable accuracy, certainly much more so 
than quantities, then the notion that the United States imports 6,000 
tons, with domestic sales value of $70 billion seems particularly 
implausible.
Though the heroin and cocaine expenditure series are carefully pro 
duced and show no internal anomalies, it is useful to also examine their 
relationship to official price series and another international production 
series produced by the federal government. The price data (table 4) 
come from a series maintained by the Drug Enforcement Administra 
tion called STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evi 
dence). 16
Table 4. Retail Prices for Cocaine and Heroin, 1988-1993 





































SOURCE: Rhodes et al. (1995, taWe 4).
Note the odd relationship between the heroin price and quantity 
series in tables 2 and 4. Though prices fall by somewhere between one- 
sixth and one-half (depending on whether one uses the high or low 
price figures) between 1988 and 1993, total consumption (as reported 
in table 2) is essentially flat over this period. Moreover, the consump 
tion totals are very low, given estimates of the total number of depen 
dent users (ca. 500,000) and recent estimates of how much users 
purchase weekly, now that heroin is both purer and cheaper than it was 
in the early 1980s. One recent study estimated that in New York and 
Chicago, median weekly consumption was about 700 milligrams,
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yielding an annual total of about 35 grams (Boyum and Rocheleau 
1994); taken nationally that would generate a total consumption of 
about 18 tons.
The cocaine price and quantity series also produce some implausi 
ble relations. In 1990 it is believed that the Colombian government's 
crackdown on the Medellin traffickers led to a sharp, temporary, 
decline in total exports, perhaps partly compensated for by a run-down 
in inventories of traffickers. Prices rise by between 20 and 50 percent 
from 1989 to 1990 and consumption falls by between 25 and 40 per 
cent, suggesting a rather higher elasticity of demand than might have 
been expected but otherwise not an implausible set of figures. In 1991, 
when the crackdown had ended, prices fell to the 1989 levels but con 
sumption was much closer to the 1990 figure, rising only between 7 
and 26 percent.
A review of the official supply side figures in table 5 points to a 
much more substantial problem of consistency. Separately from the 
cocaine consumption figures, the same research group also produces a 
series labeled "Cocaine available for consumption in the United States 
(after discounting [sic] for Federal seizures)." These are supply side 
estimates, produced by taking estimates of total production in the 
source countries (Bolivia, Colombia,and Peru) and then subtracting 
estimates of what is seized along the way, consumed elsewhere 
(including Western Europe) and seized by U.S. federal government 
agencies. The estimates for 1989 to 1993 are produced in table 5. Note 
that these figures are substantially higher than the domestic consump 
tion estimates reported in table 2; indeed, in 1990 the high end of the 
range is twice the high end for domestic consumption.
Table 5. Trends in the Cocaine Supply, 1989-1993
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Cocaine available for
consumption in the U.S. 
(metric tons) 361-473
Retail value of cocaine in the









SOURCE: Rhodes et al (1955, table B).
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Some of the difference may be explained by seizures made by state 
and local agencies; in 1987 these agencies were estimated to have 
seized about half as much as their federal counterparts (Godshaw, Kop- 
pell, and Pancoast 1987). Over the period considered here, federal sei 
zures were between about 100 and 120 tons. However, even subtracting 
50 or 60 tons from the supply side series, the supply side estimate in 
most years is substantially higher than the domestic estimate.
But of more immediate concern to us is the lack of any notable 
change in the supply available to the United States in 1990; the drop 
from 1989 is about 3 percent. This of course is inconsistent with the 
observed increase in U.S. retail price in 1990 and the reduction in esti 
mated consumption, as well as with the official (and plausible view) 
that the Colombian crackdown had a substantial effect. Reference to 
the European market or local seizures does not help explain this incon 
sistency, since these series are unlikely to exhibit year-to-year changes 
large enough to explain much of this. To make this lack of change in 
1990 even more dramatic, note that the only year of substantial change 
is 1993, when the estimated supply dropped by about one-third. Yet 
this decline is not reflected, as one might have expected, in either the 
domestic consumption or retail price figures; indeed, prices dropped by 
about 5 percent!
The supply side series undermines the credibility of the domestic 
estimates. Or it may simply be that any figures generated from distant 
lands by unknown processes should be viewed as worthless.
Estimates of world consumption or expenditure have no known 
provenance. Five hundred billion dollars is the standard figure cited in 
official and unofficial publications. The U.S. State Department, despite 
its imperialistic estimation of production and (often) consumption in 
individual foreign countries, does not attempt a global estimate. I 
believe it unlikely that the global figure is much more than twice the 
U.S. total. Though the United States accounts for only 5 percent of 
world opium production (through its heroin consumption), most opium 
and heroin are sold in Asia at prices that are a minuscule proportion of 
the U.S. street price. The United States still consumes most of the 
world's cocaine production. For marijuana, again most of the world 
production is consumed in countries with much lower retail prices.
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The Production Process
I will assume the reader is convinced from the above that the official 
numbers (prices, quantities, expenditures) are seriously flawed, though 
the domestic expenditure estimates may be exempt from that judg 
ment. While I might claim to have expertise in this area, having spent 
ten years in empirical research related to drug policy, clearly none of 
the flaws exposed here require any special technical skill or insight to 
discover; all that is required is a willingness to subject the series, indi 
vidually and as a group, to some modestly serious analytic scrutiny. 
This section offers some observations as to why the numbers persist in 
such disarray.
The current drug production estimates are generally detached from 
the policy process. Though it is worth noting that it would be hard 
under any circumstance to produce estimates with the authority and 
precision of the standard indicators of economic activity, one reason 
they are of low quality is that they simply have no consequence for any 
senior decision makers. This is an example of a principle called GOGI 
(garbage out, garbage in), the converse of the usual GIGO (garbage in, 
garbage out); since no one uses the estimates for any important pur 
pose, they are produced without care or scrutiny. The State Department 
is required by statute to produce the international production figures 
annually. It cannot simply claim an incapacity to meet the statutory 
requirement. Nor, I suspect, is there any justification for large invest 
ments in improving the available data. There is still no excuse for pro 
ducing implausible figures or inconsistent series but, given the lack of 
political or external analytic scrutiny, not much incentive to do other 
wise.
The Mexican marijuana production figures illustrate dramatically 
the detachment of the estimates from the policy process. The increases 
and declines in the INCSR estimates have no apparent consequence for 
U.S. policy decisions. Congress did not feel the need to take new mea 
sures against Mexico when suddenly the State Department produced 
figures suggesting that the U.S. marijuana market was completely 
dominated by Mexico; nor did the administration make any noticeable 
change in policy. There was no cry for increased domestic efforts 
against marijuana because of the sudden discovery that American users
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were consuming vastly more than had previously been estimated. The 
1989 figure was initially explained simply as the result of changes in 
estimating techniques, not in the underlying realities. Nonetheless, the 
implication of the new figures was that Mexico was swamping the 
United States, and indeed the world, since its 30,000 tons accounted 
for five-sixths of the officially estimated global total. Surely this would 
be reason for alarm, for a call to Mexico to deal with a problem that 
must be much more serious than previously realized. Yet, the harshness 
of U.S. political rhetoric about Mexico's drug control efforts was much 
diminished at the end of the 1980s, precisely when these estimates 
were at their highest levels.
The price series are even more separated from the policy process 
they are supposed to inform. They serve no bureaucratic purpose that I 
have been able to discern and are almost never cited politically or in 
the media. One can reasonably ask why they are produced at all. Per 
haps the need of U.S. officials to appear authoritative in public discus 
sions is sufficient motivation to produce the numbers, without 
providing a good reason for doing the job well.
With no audience for these estimates, agencies are motivated to give 
them little attention. My impression is that no one of any prominence 
at the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Department of State 
ever spent time as an analyst or producer of these estimates. Both agen 
cies, with very different organizational cultures, share a marked lack of 
interest in numeracy.
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the National Insti 
tute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the principal federal research agency con 
cerned with illicit drugs, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, which produces the major indicator series 
such as the NHSDA and Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) sys 
tem, play peripheral roles in the estimation process described here. 
They are much more data- and analysis-oriented agencies than DEA or 
the Department of State, but as public health bureaus have never been 
much interested in markets per se, seen as principally the concern of 
law enforcement agencies. Though the NHSDA does provide critical 
information for the consumption estimates sponsored by Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), NIDA itself has only recently 
started to give attention to questions about expenditures and consump 
tion in the survey.
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The Potential Uses of Quantity, Price, and Revenue Estimates
What is needed by way of measurement? Clearly this is entirely a 
policy-driven enterprise, without any scientific goals. In this respect it 
differs from the collection of data on domestic use and abuse, which 
serves a variety of scientific purposes (for example, understanding the 
etiology of the drug use) as well as programmatic planning. So the cen 
tral question, putting aside the detail of the statutory requirements 
imposed on the executive branch by the boundlessly ambitious and 
imperialistic Congress, is what decisions these figures could usefully 
inform. At the moment only the certification process makes even a pre 
tense of being connected to these estimates, and a pretense is all that it 
is. Certification decisions are driven by politics rather than numbers; 
i.e., the administration forgives U.S. friends even when they are 
deemed noncooperative (for example, Colombia in 1995), and con 
demns those with whom it is not on good terms (e.g., Burma, Iran, and 
Syria). 17 Without a specification of policy needs, the estimates will 
continue to flounder.
Sensible estimates of quantities, prices, and revenues could, in prin 
ciple, serve a number of important functions. For example, the efficacy 
of interdiction may be crudely estimated by comparing seizures with 
estimated shipments or by estimating the margin between import and 
export prices, which represents the smugglers' margin. 18 Export prices 
from individual producing countries could be a useful measure of how 
stringently that nation enforces laws against growers and refiners. The 
revenue estimates provide a basis for estimating the impact of asset 
forfeitures; for example, if total revenues are $50 billion, then $2 bil 
lion in asset forfeitures constitutes a 4 percent tax, stochastically 
applied. These kinds of calculations are helpful in developing and 
understanding the promise and limits of these kinds of programs.
In 1971 Max Singer published an oft-cited article arguing that if one 
believed the official numbers with respect to the prevalence of heroin 
addiction, the dependence of addicts on theft, and the price of a heroin 
habit, then New York City did not exist anymore; it had been stolen by 
junkies. My first published article on drug policy was an extension of 
that critique, pointing out that though the measurement enterprise had 
become more elaborate, it still produced striking inconsistencies (Reu-
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ter 1984). Another ten years on, the process has become yet more elab 
orate. There is coherence and good documentation for the revenue 
estimates, but the process is still capable of producing much nonsense. 
Until these series and estimates are integrated into the policy process, 
they are unlikely to get much better.
NOTES
1. For a scholarly claim citing $500 billion, see Tullis (1991). For the United Nations use of 
this figure, see United Nations Drug Control Program (1994, p. 1). A respected journalist, Jessica 
Mathews (1995), recently retailed this figure, citing federal enforcement agencies.
2. The most systematic estimate, using the household survey described below (note 12), is 1.8 
million persons selling in 1991 (Caulkins and McCaffrey 1993). It is likely that most of them sell 
on a very occasional basis (see Reuter, MacCoun, and Murphy 1990).
3.1 infer this from the publications and contacts over the years with participants in the estima 
tion process. No cost figures have ever, to my knowledge, been published.
4. If a nation is not certified as making maximum efforts to control production and export, 
then the United States will not provide certain aid and will vote against loans from multilateral 
financial institutions such as the World Bank.
5. Ten tons of opium yield one ton of heroin.
6. The implied annual heroin consumption per addict is 300 grams, 10 to 20 times the figure 
for the United States. For a recent estimate of weekly heroin consumption per addict of about 700 
milligrams, about 35 grams per annum, see Rocheleau and Boyum (1994). No doubt heroin is 
vastly cheaper in Burma, but incomes are also on the order of 1 percent of U.S. levels.
7. This section draws extensively on Reuter and Ronfeldt (1992).
8. See Kleiman (1989).
9. "New analytic methodologies have enabled the U.S. government to assess more accurately 
the extent of marijuana cultivation during the past several years" (INCSR 1990, p. 13). The report 
included no revision of previous years' estimates.
10. Separate models are available for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana (Resetar and Dombey- 
Moore 1994; Childress I994a; Childress 1994b).
11. In theory it is possible that the Colombian cocaine prices are not really market prices but 
instead internal prices for an integrated producer, set low for some intrafirm bargaining. This 
seems implausible, given that there are some independent cocaine producers in Colombia.
12. The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), with sample sizes between 
20,000 and 32,000 in recent years, produces these estimates.
13. The latest of three published versions is What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 
1988-1993 (Rhodes et al. 1995).
14. For example, Everingham and Rydell (1994) estimate that 22 percent of cocaine users 
account for 70 percent of total consumption.
15. Details are provided in Rhodes et al. (1995, appendix 1).
16. On using STRIDE systematically, see Caulkins (1994).
17. In 1995, much to the chagrin of Colombian leaders, the president offered only a qualified 
certification, invoking a "national interest" waiver clause that allows for certification even if the 
nation is not meeting the criterion of making maximum effort to suppress the trade.
18. For a price-oriented analysis of interdiction effectiveness, see Reuter, Crawford, and Cave 
(1988).
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